Extending AToCC: a reply by Smith, Tim J.
 Extending AToCC: a reply 
 
Tim J. Smith 
31/12/11 
 
Word count = 3,019 words 
 
 
The intention of my paper, The Attentional Theory of Cinematic Continuity 
(AToCC; this volume) was to bring together disparate lines of research on 
cinematic continuity and make an intentionally provocative first stab at 
theorising a cognitive foundation for the continuity editing conventions that 
pervade film. If our understanding of film cognition is to progress, clear 
hypotheses need to be proposed that can be empirically tested and theoretically 
challenged. To this end, the high quality and variety of the six responses that 
constitute the rest of this volume are hugely encouraging. My only regret is that I 
will not be able to deal with each of their insightful comments in the space 
permitted.  
 
Seeing through film 
 
Several of the respondents (Turvey, Freeland, and Smith) question the 
confidence with which I borrow from the “ecological” view of film perception 
(e.g. Anderson, 1996) as they claim that the principles of continuity editing fail  
mirror  the way we attend to and perceive real-world scenes. My argument is 
that active vision deployed in service of an inquisitive viewer looking to seek out 
information of interest, but restricted by a limited capacity attentional, visual 
and memory system, invalidates many of the incompatibilities previously 
identified.  However, Turvey rightly points out that, while I state in my original 
article that a cognitive theory of continuity must specify how we overcome these 
incompatibilities, I fail to do so, only indirectly dealing with the incompatibilities 
as I  explain the cognitive foundations of several key editing rules. Let me  
address this concern by replying to the problem as quoted by Turvey: “in real life 
every experience or chain of experiences is enacted for every observer in an 
uninterrupted spatial and temporal sequence” whereas this is “not so in film” due 
to the fact that “the time that is being photographed may be interrupted at any 
point” by editing (Arnheim, 1957; pp. 20-21). 
 
Perception, not sensation 
 
Before  addressing this problem, I should emphasize that AToCC proposes 
that continuity editing mirrors real-world perception and not sensation; the 
incompatibility problem as stated by Arnheim is phrased in terms of  audiovisual 
sensation and  not our perception of it.  I agree that the physical form of film 
bears very little resemblance to the light projected on to a statici retina by a 
spatiotemporally continuous real-world scene. However, we do not have direct 
access to this sensory stimulation. Our experience of an audiovisual environment 
is mediated by perception. For film to mirror our experience of an audiovisual 
scene it must, therefore approximate our perception of that scene rather than 
the direct sensation. 
 
However, reframing the problem in terms of perception does not negate 
the argument that we normally perceive real-world scenes as spatiotemporally 
continuous and editing violates this assumption by involuntarily shifting our 
viewpoint in space and time. How does AToCC explain this apparent 
incompatibility? 
 
Does active vision require agency? 
 
In her response to my article, Cynthia Freeland emphasizes the issue of 
agency and wonders how continuity editing can mirror natural perception 
without the viewer voluntarily influencing the changes in viewpoint. I argue that 
the instantaneous change in viewpoint presented across a cut does not present a 
problem for our visual system because such changes occur 3-5 times every 
second when we perform a saccadic eye movement. Although a change in shot 
may also distort perspective on a scene or location of the observer/camera, these 
distortions pass unnoticed (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2004) as long as what 
we are interested in is instantly recognisable after the cut. I state that continuity 
“is about enabling the viewer to shift their attention to the audiovisual details 
currently relevant to them and the narrative” (pp. 15). A cut that preserves a 
priori continuity must cue attention prior to a cut so that the change in viewpoint 
mirrors our desired attentional shift. This makes the viewer a collaborator in the 
change in viewpoint, giving the illusion of agency.  
 However, Freeland’s concern about the absence of agency extends beyond 
the motivation for a change in viewpoint to the issue of which neural pathways 
process the changing visual input.. She borrows from Matthen (2005) the 
distinction between “descriptive” vision and “motion-guiding” vision or more 
commonly referred to “vision for action” (Milner & Goodale, 1995). The former is 
used to represent visual scenes from a distance, without the intention of 
interaction whereas the latter represents objects and the scene relative to the 
viewer in preparation for the motor plans required for interaction. These two 
types of vision utilize distinct but interacting visual pathways in the brain: the 
ventral (“What”) and dorsal (“Where”) pathways, respectively.  Given that 
viewers can never inflict their will on a film, Freeland argues that we must adopt 
anunnatural purely descriptive viewing mode that only utilizes the ventral 
pathway. Freeland’s argument implies that she believes the absence of vision for 
action distances our visual experience of film from reality to an extent that it 
invalidates my argument that continuity editing mirrors the way we perceive 
reality. I would argue against this interpretation as it neglects the interaction 
between the two visual pathways and the fact that vision for action is normally 
preceded by descriptive vision. Motor actions are often preceded by “look ahead” 
fixations that identify relevant objects, their location, and their predicted 
movements relative to the agent (Land & Taler, 2009). For example, when 
driving a car we fixate the section of the road 1 second ahead of our current 
location irrespective of driving speed (Land & Lee, 1994). These anticipatory 
glances are thought to enable us to build a representation of the space within 
which we will act, such as the curvature of the bend. The motor act of steering 
the wheel occurs after our gaze has sought out the relevant information.  
 
I would argue that continuity editing mirrors the first two stages of 
attention and motor planning but replaces the final stage of motor action with a 
cut. When observing a real-world scene such as a conversation we may find our 
viewpoint of a relevant part of the scene obscured either by being out of our field 
of view, necessitating a head rotation or occluded by other objects, necessitating 
a change in viewing position (see Turvey’s response in relation to matched-
exit/entrances). The motor plans to change viewpoint will be preceded by 
anticipatory shifts of gaze and/or attention in the direction of the desired object. 
When such a scene is represented via continuity editing, our anticipatory shifts 
of attention remain and we may also prepare the motor plans necessary to 
execute the change in viewpoint (e.g. rotating our heads to look off screen) but 
the cut beats us to it by providing the desired shift in viewpoint. We have 
engaged in two thirds of the cognitive processes involved in the volitional change 
in viewpoint which may be enough to trick us into believing we were responsible 
for the shift or, at least to not invalidate our a priori assumptions of 
spatiotemporal continuity. As Freeland concludes, the extent to which the viewer 
is active across a cut and the two visual pathways are engaged should be a topic 
of future research. The most promising techniques for answering this question 
will be neuroimaging (e.g. functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; fMRI) due to 
its ability to directly identify the activity of the two neural pathways  during film 
viewing. 
 
Adapting to film 
 
Turvey and Freeland seem to believe that the absence of the final stage of 
actively attending to an object in the real-world, i.e. the motor act of saccading or 
rotating our heads to locate the target, negates the ecological view of film 
perception. I do not believe this is the case. .  There is no default mode in which 
we perceive the real-world. Our visual system is constantly adapting to the 
demands of each environment and our intentions within it. This adaptation can 
be physiological, e.g. pupil dilation, binocular vergence and accommodation of 
the lens to suit the luminance and depth of an image; motor, e.g. modifying the 
amplitude of saccades and their frequency to the density of information; or 
perceptual, e.g. changing how we map sensory input to representation. Later in 
his response, Turvey agrees that trying to compare the way we perceive the real-
world to that of film is a fool’s errand as both are highly variable and open to a 
high degree of interpretation. 
 
The most striking example of perceptual adaptation can be demonstrated 
using prism glasses. Hermann von Helmholtz first demonstrated this 
phenomenon at the end of the 19th century when he showed that wearing prism 
glasses inverting the visual world initially made interaction with the world 
impossible but the wearers quickly adapted. This adaptation was subsequently 
shown to be due to neural plasticity: the changing of neural pathways and 
enlisting of existing pathways for different ends. Such plasticity is critical for our 
survival in ever changing environments. Perceptual adaptation and rapid 
learning of the rules governing a particular sensory experience are natural 
aspects of real-world cognition. Without them infants would never learn how to 
stand, walk or talk. Adapting to the constraints of a new audiovisual 
environment such as the internal logic of an Avant Garde movie is not, as 
Freeland states in her response,  “unnatural” but a critical component of real-
world cognition.  
 
I believe that the way in which continuity editing approximates our 
normally volitional changes in viewpoint within a scene may constitute a form of 
adaptation. Even without much prior exposure to film we rapidly understand the 
physical constraints of the screen and selectively inhibit the final stage of 
actively orienting to objects within the depicted scene, handing control of our 
head rotations and viewpoint changes over to the filmmaker instead. Such 
immediate adaptation may partly explain the anthropological evidence that 
viewers who have never previously been exposed to edited moving-images are 
still able to comprehend the events depicted (cited in Messaris’ response). 
Schwan and Ildirar (2010) have recently presented similar evidence of 
immediate adaptation to film by naïve film viewers in a remote region of Turkey. 
Schwan and Ildirar constructed short edited sequences using a range of 
continuity rules such as establishing shots, shot/reverse-shot, crosscutting, and 
temporal ellipsis. They found that naïve viewers were able to comprehend edited 
sequences as long as they depicted a familiar and clear line of action. 
Conventions that did not contain continuity of action, such as an establishing 
shot of a house followed by a man inside the house required extensive prior 
exposure and would be described by naïve viewers as seperate scenes. This 
evidence supports my proposal in AToCC that sensory inauthencity such as that 
described by Arnheim is irrelevant as long as viewers can attend to what is of 
interest across the cut and perceive the relevant features of a scene. Focused 
perceptual authenticity trumps sensory inauthenticity. 
 
The curious case of the missing comic continuityii 
 
Adaptation of existing perceptual skills to the physical constraints of the 
medium also explains Greg Smith’s comment about the differences between the 
conventions used to present spatiotemporally continuous scenes in film and 
comics. Comics do not always adhere to the 180 degree rule because viewer gaze 
is constrained by reading direction (left to right, top to bottom in Western 
comics) and the need to fit content to the page. Comics borrow heavily from 
cinema, often using establishing shots, shot/reverse-shot sequences and the 
analytical breakdown of a scene via frames (McCloud, 1994).However, Greg 
Smith is correct to identify that cinematic conventions that preserve a line of 
action (e.g. 180 degree rule) do not fit so comfortably with the physical 
constraints of reading direction and are often sacrificed. Rather than posing a 
problem for the ecological component of AToCC I believe these medium specific 
differences confirm my emphasis on the “continuity of attention”: being able to 
shift attention to the features of a scene that are of interest to the viewer/reader. 
Comics accomplish this by isolating spatiotemporal snapshots of key moments of 
a scene and implying the spatiotemporal relationships between frames. This 
reduces a scene down to its communicative essence while accommodating the 
physical constraints of the medium. A novel uses a similar but more extreme 
form of reduction via a symbolic form of representation and relies more heavily 
on the viewer to represent the communicated events. We can view literature and 
film as two extremes on a spectrum of immediacy with comics somewhere in 
between. The intention of each mode of storytelling may be similar: 
communicate the essential events of a story within the constraints of the 
medium. However, the sensory immediacy of film means that this must be 
accomplished by accommodating our natural perceptual tendencies such as 
orienting to motion, out of sight sounds or following gaze cues.  
 
The primacy of narrative action  
 
Returning to the rephrased incompatibility between film and reality 
posed at the beginning of this article, how does AToCC explain spatiotemporal 
ellipsis? Several of the respondents (Turvey, Freeland, Smith, Rogers, Levin and 
Hymel) praised AToCC for the depth with which it tackled issues of how we 
perceive continuity across cuts that have the intention of preserving 
spatiotemporal continuity, e.g. match-Action cuts. However, they questioned 
how it might be extended to deal with “the richer more meaningful experiences” 
(Rogers, pp. 2) that are the typical realm of film theory such as emotion, 
narrative, and aesthetics.  Sheena Rogers’ three levels of aesthetic experience -- 
sense and soma, art and affect, truth and transcendence -- may capture the full 
range of cinematic experiences but I believe they are beyond the scope of a single 
cognitive theory of film like AToCC. However, I believe narrative comprehension 
(within Roger’s second level) is a tenable extension of AToCC. As correctly 
hypothesized by Freeland “Following the flow of visual continuity, a viewer is 
probably at the same time generating hypotheses about both the smaller and the 
larger stories within which the visual episodes fit” (pp. 8). I briefly discuss such 
higher-order hypotheses in the section Complex cuts and combination of cues (pp. 
28) but a full expansion of how I believe AToCC can operate at the level of 
narrative would require considerably more space than is permitted.  
 
In brief, I believe that the three stages of AToCC presented in relation to 
spatiotemporal continuity – cuing attention pre-cut, formulating perceptual 
inquiries, and matching minimal expectations post-cut – also operate across cuts 
with action and narrative continuity. For example, establishing a rhythm of 
cross-cutting between two parallel actions can allow viewers to prepare for the 
shift in attention to the new action and formulate expectations about what will 
be presented after the cut. A chase sequence spanning many locations and points 
in time focuses viewer attention on the action and does not require precise 
spatiotemporal continuity. The sequence of alternating matched-exit/entrance 
cuts need only to present snapshots of the action in which critical events happen 
such as the protagonist doubling back or the pursuer catching up. Viewer 
attention is focused on the plight of the protagonist and they only need to 
represent sufficient information to comprehend this event such as proximity 
between protagonist and pursuer.  
 
Evidence for the primacy of narrative action comes from the visual 
anthropology studies cited earlier (e.g. Schwan & Ildirar, 2010) and the 
anomalous edit blindness for within-scene cuts (Smith & Henderson, 2008). In 
my edit blindness study, alongside the finding that a third of all match-action 
cuts were missed during an explicit cut detection task, I also found that a quarter 
of all within-scene cuts were missed. These cuts were not preceded by an onset 
of motion or an actor’s gaze shift. However, within-scene cuts resulted in 
significantly greater edit blindness than between-scene cuts or gaze-cue cuts. 
What is continuous across most within-scene cuts is action, whether it be 
dialogue, actor movement or interaction.  fMRI evidence from Magliano and 
Zacks (2011) suggests that cuts with action continuity may be processed by 
different brain regions than cuts with spatiotemporal continuity and spatial 
updating may be suppressed in favor of attending to the action. Whether cuts 
with action continuity utilize the three stages of AToCC and what the 
consequence of violating each stage is on the perception of action continuity 
must be the topic of future empirical investigations. 
 
 
The fallacy of prediction 
 
Finally, I commend Dan Levin and Alicia Hymel’s response for the depth 
to which they engaged with the implications of AToCC. Levin and Hymel criticize 
AToCC for its over-emphasis on prediction. They rightly question whether “it is 
really necessary to be constantly predicting the near future?...as the activity is 
likely to be computationally and representationally intensive.”  AToCC borrowed 
this emphasis on prediction from Jeff Zack’s event segmentation theory (EST) 
which states that we perceive boundaries between events in natural human 
activities when our ability to predict the future form of the activity drops below a 
certain threshold (Magliano & Zacks, 2011). AToCC takes this idea and 
incorporates it into the second and final stage of continuity perception: 
formulating expectations and checking expectations post-cut. However, Levin 
and Hymel’s evidence that participants failed to notice the reordering of actions 
in an edited sequence suggests that prediction doesn’t happen by default and 
that postdiction, i.e. prediction after the fact, might actually be more common. In 
AToCC, postdiction would allow the perception of a posteriori continuity but only 
after the perception of a priori discontinuity. If Levin and Hymel are correct, this 
may mean that a posteriori continuity is more common than a priori continuity 
even within films strictly adhering to the Hollywood style. This hypothesis 
should be tested in two ways 1) statistical analysis of the frequency of cuts in 
existing movies that satisfy the conditions for a priori continuity outlined in 
AToCC, and 2) further empirical investigations to identify the perceptual 
consequences of cuts that do or do not meet these conditions. 
 
In conclusion, I am very grateful to the respondents for drawing attention 
to assumptions of AToCC and necessary extensions that I omitted to address in 
the initial article. I hope I have provided insightful replies to these comments and 
suggested ways in which AToCC may be extended in the future. Film is an ever 
changing, constantly amazing, and beautiful medium that goes right to the core 
of what makes us human. I hope that the theory I have presented here and in the 
main article expands our understanding of the cognitive processes involved in 
film perception without losing any of this majesty.   
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Endnotes 
 
                                                        
i I specify a "static" retina as I will argue later that the addition of eye 
movements, shifting the image on the retina and changing perspective on the 
scene is the first way in which our perception of the real-world begins to 
approximate that of edited moving-images. 
ii By “continuity”, I am referring to the same spatiotemporal continuity discussed 
in relation to film. The term is confusing in the context of comics as “continuity” 
is more commonly used to refer to consistency in the story universe belonging to 
each of the main comic book publishers (e.g. DC and Marvel). This form of 
continuity ensures that when Batman kills a nemesis in one issue the same 
nemesis doesn’t crop up alive in a later issue of Spiderman (unless it is in an 
“alternative universe” plot arc!).  Such universe continuity has been absent from 
comic book movie adaptations to date but this will be addressed in The Avengers 
(2011). 
 
